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Abstract
Goodlad, et al. (2002) rightly point out that a culture can either resist or support change. Schein’s 
(2010) model of culture indicates observable behaviors of a culture can be explained by exposing 
underlying shared values and basic assumptions that give meaning to the performance. Yet culture is 
many- faceted and complex. So Schein advised a clinical approach to cultural analysis that calls for 
identifying a problem in order to focus the analysis on relevant values and assumptions. This project 
starts with two assumptions: (1) The erosion of democratic education is a visible overt behavior of the 
current U.S. macro- culture, and (2) this is a problem. I intend to use this problem of the erosion of 
democratic education as a basis for a cultural analysis. My essential question is: What are the deeper, 
collective, competing value commitments and shared basic assumptions that hinder efforts for demo-
cratic education? The purpose of this paper is to start a conversation about particular cultural limita-
tions and barriers we are working with as we move toward recapturing the civic mission of education.
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Producing economic growth does not mean producing democracy” (Nussbaum, 2010, p. 15). Yet the discourse of United States’ education today is 
dominated by economic rationality with scant attention paid to the 
democratic purposes and civic functions of education. It is the aim 
of this paper to explore the current marginalization of democratic 
education by interpreting this phenomenon as reflecting one 
competing value and three basic philosophical assumptions that 
are shared by a majority in our culture. I conduct this interpretive 
analysis using Schein’s (2010) model of culture and his method of 
cultural, clinical analysis.
Schein’s Method: A Cultural, Clinical Analysis
Imagine you are at a card table, and a dealer deals you five cards. 
She then states two rules for the game:
 1. Ranking of hands is (lowest to highest) one of a kind, two of 
a kind, et cetera, with aces high (no straights or flushes).
 2. You can exchange zero to five cards once.
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When I conduct this game with volunteers, no one ever 
comes up with four aces and a king in one hand. Why? The most 
likely answer is “Because the probability of getting that hand is 
extremely low.” I then ask, “Why did not anyone pick up the 
deck of cards and filter through them to find the aces and the 
king when conducting the exchange of cards? After all, nothing 
in the rules specifies or prohibits how to go about exchanging 
the cards.”
This little demonstration illustrates one way to think  
about culture. In the case above, we participate in the card- 
playing culture. Many of us have played enough games of cards 
that we now play with an implicit set of rules, in this case  
rules that determine the way we exchange cards. These rules 
have been ingrained into our performance and are largely 
subconscious. Thus, one way to define culture is: an implicit set 
of rules that govern behavior. Consistent with this description 
of culture is the simple yet complete one offered by Quinn 
(1992): “A culture is a people enacting a story” (p. 41). Both of 
these views of culture imply that the story (the implicit set of 
rules) supplies the meaning to the action, and as such is the key 
to the performance.
Goodlad, Mantle- Bromley, and Goodlad (2004) rightly point 
out that a culture can either resist or support change. Kegan and 
Lahey (2009) explain more specifically that resistance to change 
can take the form such that even if groups ostensibly commit to a 
goal they may still participate in behavior that is counterproduc-
tive because of deeper competing commitments and assumptions. 
These deeper commitments and assumptions, the implicit rules or 
story that is being enacted, can either aid the change process or 
hinder it.
Similarly, Schein (2010) identifies three levels of culture (see 
Figure 1). On the surface are artifacts: including observable overt 
behaviors, the actual performances of a group. In the case of our 
card- playing culture, the artifact is the observable behavior of 
exactly how the cards are exchanged, such as putting three cards 
down on the table and waiting for the dealer to disseminate the 
cards from the top of the deck to the player. Beneath the artifacts 
are espoused values: These are the stated goals and philosophies, the 
public statements of identity and what is considered right and 
good. For example, perhaps the card players value fairness and not 
cheating. Thus, values are part of the story and give meaning to the 
ostensible behaviors. Finally, more deeply are basic underlying 
assumptions: the taken- for- granted shared beliefs. These are also 
part of the story that is enacted. For the given example, most likely 
the person exchanging cards has the core belief that it would be 
cheating if she or he picked up the deck to look at the cards.
The point of Quinn’s (1992) definition, Kegan and Lahey’s 
(2009) analysis, and Schein’s (2010) model of culture is that 
observable behaviors can be explained and understood by expos-
ing the relevant underlying values and basic assumptions.
As asserted, culture is important because its power may either 
help or hinder change. Yet “fish discover water last.” It is hard to 
uncover our shared basic assumptions because they have become 
taken for granted and are operating outside of our awareness. 
Furthermore, Schein (2010) notes, cultures are complex and 
involve many dimensions of assumptions. We cannot uncover all 
of the assumptions and dimensions of culture concurrently. For 
this reason, Schein (2010) does not propose a more ethnographic 
approach of attempting to describe the whole of a culture but 
rather a clinical approach that looks at a specific problem to be 
addressed— to evaluate the degree to which basic assumptions aid 
or hinder some strategic purpose that the group is concerned about 
(p. 323). By focusing on a problem, we can start the interpretive 
process of uncovering values and assumptions that relate to that 
specific problem so they may be brought to our awareness and 
possibly challenged. A problem to be addressed is both a reason for 
the cultural analysis and a focus for a specific set of assumptions to 
be revealed. Thus a clinical cultural analysis begins by identifying a 
problem that a group is concerned about and then uncovering the 
underlying story— the shared values and assumptions that are 
relevant to the issue at hand.
The Problem: The Erosion of Democratic Education
Democratic aims in United States education are marginalized. 
Consider this artifact of our culture as summarized by Engel 
(2000).
Current- day discussions about the future of education are conducted 
almost entirely [emphasis added] in the language of the free market: 
individual achievement, competition, choice, economic growth, and 
national security— with only occasional lip service being given to 
egalitarian and democratic goals . . . market ideology’s virtually 
unchallenged dominance threatens the very existence of public 
education as a social institution, because its logic ultimately 
eliminates any justification for collective and democratic control of the 
schools. (pp. 3– 6)
When Rod Paige (former secretary of education, Republican) 
and Senator Tom Daschle (Democrat) debated in 2006, not once 
were the words democracy or citizenship uttered (NCLB debate, 
2006). Economic rationality has taken over. As Spring (2008) 
observes, “In fact, by the twenty- first century most Americans 
seemed to accept business as a natural partner in the control of 
Figure 1. Schein’s 3 Levels of Culture (n.d.)
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schools,” and this “has made economic goals the number- one 
priority of public schools” (p. 32). A cursory look at media reports 
and political discussions reveals that school officials and politicians 
justify “investments” in education as a way to compete in the global 
economy and as a way to grow a local economy to develop a larger 
tax base. The banality of headlines such as “Schools a Strong 
Investment, Universities to Tell Law Makers” (Kurtzman, 2005, p. 
A1) and “Award Lauds Efforts to Prepare Students for Workforce” 
(Wright, 2005, p. A12) corroborate and provide verity to Engel’s 
depiction of the marginalization, if not complete lack, of demo-
cratic discourse in education. The value, role, and goal of schooling 
are not the building of a strong democratic community but, rather, 
the fostering individuals who can engage effectively and individu-
ally in economic pursuits. And it is to this goal that accountability 
measures aim.
Of course, the history of American public schooling is rife 
with contestation over schooling’s goals, representing conflicting 
values, ideals, and beliefs. It is debatable whether United States 
public education ever held a central role for its civic purposes. 
Callahan’s (1964) Education and the Cult of Efficiency, Haley’s 
(2006) The Factory System, and many other analyses have shown 
capitalistic values often take precedence over democratic ones in 
our system of schooling. Yet our current era is especially trouble-
some because whatever discursive space for democratic purposes 
of education existed beforehand have become scarily marginalized.
Thus, I start with two assumptions: (1) The erosion of the civic 
purposes and aims of public education is a visible overt behavior 
(i.e., artifact) of the current U.S. macro- culture (see Figure 2), and 
(2) this is a problem. Under Schein’s (2010) model and clinical 
cultural analysis method, the essential question becomes: What are 
the deeper, collective, competing value commitments and shared 
basic assumptions that conflict with and hinder efforts toward a 
more central role for democratic education?
I propose one key value and three shared basic assumptions 
that help give meaning to our macro- culture’s behavior of the 
marginalization of democratic education. I do this so we can at 
least recognize the cultural limitations and barriers we are working 
with and potentially challenge them as a way of recapturing a civic 
mission of education.
Neoliberal Freedom versus Democratic Education
What Engel (2000) called “market ideology” and Dewey (1935) 
coined “economic liberalism” (p. 18), can also be known as 
neoliberalism.1 Neoliberal philosophy is rooted in the general 
tradition of liberalism. The terms liberal and liberalism as a 
particular social philosophy appeared at the beginning of the 19th 
century, yet the ideas they refer to go back as far as ancient Greece 
(p. 15). This liberalism began as a response to the oppressiveness of 
the tyrannical governments, as articulated by Locke in 1688 (p. 15). 
It was liberalism’s original goal to free the individual from those 
oppressive states, including religious and economic hierarchies. 
From this common ground sprung two different schools of thought 
as to how to achieve that goal. “American liberalism involves both a 
laissez- faire theme that maximizes individual liberties and a social 
welfare theme that encompasses principles of equality of opportu-
nity and justice” (Knight Abowitz, 2000, p.24). The social welfare 
theme Knight Abowitz(2000) is speaking of comes from a utilitar-
ian concern for increasing the greatest amount of good as expressed 
by 19th- century Benthamites (Dewey, 1935, p. 19). Accordingly, that 
strand of American liberalism is known as utilitarian liberalism.
Neoliberalism blossomed from the laissez- faire strand of 
liberalism. Hayek (1960) is the oft- cited father of neoliberalism, and 
it was his book The Constitution of Liberty that Margaret Thatcher 
slammed down on a podium while proclaiming, “This is our Bible!” 
(Ranelagh, 1991, p. ix). In this book Hayek contributes a quintessen-
tial representation of neoliberalism, including the primacy of the 
value of a particular notion of freedom. Thinkers such as Friedman 
have imported his ideas to America, where they have found fertile 
soil and taken root (Friedman, 1962). But it is Hayek’s (1960) 
formulation and articulation of “freedom,”2 the clarity and detail of 
his philosophical language in The Constitution of Liberty, which 
make his expressions the ones I will use to describe neoliberalism, 
the neoliberal version of freedom, and the problem it creates for 
democratic education.
One cautionary note must be made clear: I am not arguing 
that Hayek’s philosophical language causes our culture to make 
sense of freedom in a particular way, for it is equally likely he 
merely articulates what was already happening. This is not to deny 
that philosophical articulations may instigate new directions. I 
simply wish to state that I am not offering a causal explanation for 
current cultural discourses of freedom, but rather using Hayek’s 
language to represent how a main strand within our shared cultural 
identity makes sense of freedom and why this account of liberty is 
so appealing to that identity.
1 In other words, I am equating laissez- faire economic liberalism with 
market ideology and neoliberalism.
2 I agree with Hayek (1960) that there is no useful distinction between 
liberty and freedom; hence I will use the terms interchangeably (p. 421).
Figure 2. Artifact of Current U.S. Culture
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Hayek’s clarity is revealed promptly on the first page of the 
first chapter in his seminal work: “The state in which a man is not 
subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others [empha-
sis added] is often distinguished as ‘individual’ or ‘personal’ 
freedom, and it is in this sense that we are using the word ‘free-
dom’” (p. 6). This definition’s essences are twofold: (1) Freedom is 
defined negatively (i.e., as “freedom from”), and (2) it is freedom 
from “coercion of the arbitrary will of another or others.” So, Hayek 
persuasively defines liberty as the individual being free from 
infringements from other people, whether collectively or individu-
ally. As such, a primary aim of liberty is to protect the individual 
from infringement by other people and the social, public sphere.
It is important to note that Hayek’s (1960) neoliberalism is 
congruent with the utilitarian strand of liberalism in the sense that 
it still seeks the same goal of maximizing the greatest good. Hayek 
sincerely believed he was charting a path toward the greater good 
and social progress (see pp. 39– 53). Yet for him, the path to social 
progress is undesigned, individual pursuit of private interests and 
goods. This is, in part, because those with wealth have the luxury to 
invent new things, such as the refrigerator, museums, and golf, 
which will eventually make their way down to the masses. In true 
trickle- down fashion, Hayek approvingly quoteds Tarde: “‘For  
the luxuries of today are the necessities of tomorrow’” (p. 43). 
Hence, for Hayek, maximizing individual freedom maximizes the 
greatest good.
By corollary, concern for the social good is seen as the greatest 
threat to liberty (p. 262), since to engage in social planning is an 
infringement on freedom. In other words, the more we try to 
enhance democratic public goods3 as a way to collectively decide 
how to live together, the more we detract from the greater good of 
individual freedom. As Sandel (2005) so deftly summarizes, “Tying 
freedom to respect for the rights of freely choosing selves dampens 
old disputes about how to form habits of self- rule” (p. 27). Accord-
ing to Hayek (1960), abandoning concern and action for public 
goods, including the formation of habits for self- rule, although 
seemingly callous, is necessary because concern for the public 
good is contradictory to the greatest good of individual freedom. 
Thus, a paradox arises in the neoliberal philosophical framework. 
3 I use the term democratic public goods throughout in the Deweyan sense 
as collective, associative, and public goods, such as social welfare and robust 
public spaces. See especially Dewey (1993).
Stated pointedly, neglecting the public good maximizes the public 
good (Knight Abowitz & Karaba, 2010).
Soder, Goodlad, and McMannon (2001) and a host of others 
rightly require us as educators to think about the conditions, 
attitudes, and character required for self- rule. These would be the 
characteristics that democratic education seeks to foster, such as 
valuing the common good and open and free communication, 
among a host of others. As such, this is a form of social planning 
and inhibits individual freedom. Within neoliberal logic, social 
planning policies, even if for democratic ends like those designed 
by democratic education proponents, are seen as infringements on 
freedom.
Thus, the neoliberal conception of freedom creates an ethical 
dilemma between the two values of freedom and democratic 
education. Not only is it that both ideals cannot be pursued at the 
same time, but they are contradictory; achieving one necessarily 
detracts from attaining the other. At best, a cost/benefit analysis is 
performed, and the two values are weighed against each other. 
Most often for the neoliberal, the value of individual freedom 
trumps that of democratic public goods. So we are left with a 
situation in which the dominant shared understanding of “free-
dom” and our shared commitment to this value not only inhibits 
democratic education, it erodes it.
Three Basic Assumptions of Neoliberal  
Freedom and the Modern Western Identity
The neoliberal conception of freedom was not just foisted on the 
American public; its roots lie deep in the cultural developments of 
the modern Western worldview. Throughout his book Sources of 
the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Taylor (1989) traces 
some of those historical and cultural developments that have 
helped form our modern Western identity.4 Although fractious, 
Taylor asserts there are certain general dominant strands of 
thought, or shared basic philosophical assumptions, that make up 
the “inescapable framework” (p. 18) that help us make sense of our 
world and our life. These beliefs are part of culture, and as part of 
culture, they are aspects of our personal identities and are learned 
4 Taylor (1989) used the term modern identity, which I slightly modi-
fied to modern Western identity. All uses of this term correspond to 
Taylor’s usage.
Figure 3.Shared Underlying Value
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(Hofstede, 1991, p. 6). They are the stories which are enacted, 
whether consciously or not.
The success of the neoliberal conception of freedom is 
partially due to the internal consistency of its specific meaning of 
freedom with three core assumptions operating powerfully in the 
background of the modern Western identity: one about the nature 
of self, one about knowing, and one about the source of morality 
(see Figure 4). I intend to show how Hayek’s (1960) neoliberal 
notion of freedom is logically consistent with these three core 
beliefs. As a result, the crux of our problem is that the neoliberal 
conception of freedom will not be easily supplanted with an 
alternative notion of freedom because the neoliberal conception 
coheres with these three deeply entrenched shared philosophical 
assumptions. I hope to illuminate these beliefs in order to recognize 
the cultural limitations and barriers they create for democratic 
education. In conclusion, I also suggest an overall strategy of 
critiquing and concertedly challenging these assumptions as a way 
of enhancing prospects for democratic education.
Individualizing Freedom: A Western Conception of Self
Both Hayek’s (1960) philosophy of freedom and the modern 
Western identity share a particular belief about the “self,” namely 
that the self is separate from the society that it inhabits. This is to 
say that individual selves are seen as ontologically distinct from 
society but together comprise society. This individualistic sense of 
self did not arise from a vacuum, but, as Taylor (1989) traces, is 
enmeshed in the historical and cultural developments of the West. 
Recorded Western philosophies of self began with Plato and the 
ancient Greeks, and in Plato’s formation, although all human selves 
share participation in the form of humanity, there are certain 
characteristic essences that make me “me,” you “you,” and every 
individual self “itself.” These eternal essences define each individual 
soul and are seen as objective; our “selves” are not created through 
our actions but, rather, discovered.
With Descartes, the Western world moved into modernity, 
and the separate and distinct self became subjectified. What this 
subjectification means is that the self “can’t be easily conceived as 
just another piece of the natural world. It is hard for us simply to list 
souls or minds alongside whatever else there is” (Taylor, 1989,  
p. 175). In Western culture, we do not like to think of ourselves as 
subject to the causal laws of nature. Our bodies may be part of the 
external, material, or “noumenal” world, but we would like to think 
that our souls, and therefore our “selves,” are not. The body and soul 
exist on different ontological planes.
Cartesian dualism’s split between the self and the external 
world, including other selves and society, does not necessarily 
mean subjectivism. Although it may be true that Cartesian 
subjectivism posits ontologically distinct selves, the converse is 
false. Tauber (1992), for example, examines numerous naturalistic 
accounts of an individual self from the biological discourses of 
genetics, evolutionary theory, and neuroscience. He traces these 
naturalistic accounts of the self back to Locke’s tabula rasa that is 
objectively in the world being acted upon by sensory data. These 
reductionist accounts of the self are also consistent with the 
Figure 4. Shared Basic Underlying AssumptionsSource of moral authority as external to human reason Cartesian epistemology Ontologi-
cally distinct individual self
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tradition of liberalism because they still posit an individual, in this 
case a material individual, as separate from the society that groups 
of individuals form.
Thus, from Plato’s ontologically distinct sense of self arose two 
developments, both seeing the self as separate and distinct from 
others: Descartes’s subjective self, and Locke’s objective, material 
self. While recognizing these multifarious views of humans and 
society within the liberal tradition, Adams (1958) highlights the 
“basic tenets that have been widely accepted which may be taken as 
defining the position with the first tenet being ‘everyone is capable 
of being a free, responsible person in society’” (p. 214). By using the 
prepositional phrase “person in society,” as opposed to person of 
society, Adams reflects liberalism’s central ontological concept of a 
dichotomy between the self and society. Either subjectively or 
objectively, the self is seen as “in society” rather than “of society.” 
These positions do not deny the social aspects of the self but 
maintain that the social influences of self do not exhaust the 
entirety of the self; that is, society does not constitute the self in any 
meaningful way.
And when the self is conceived as separate from society there 
becomes:
[a]n inevitable antagonism between the individual and society. The 
individual is not taken as someone who is essentially a social being, 
but rather as an atomistic, vulnerable being who needs to be protected 
from an abstract entity called “the society.” (Silier, 2005, p. 9)
Hayek (1960) derives his conception of individual freedom by 
means of this central philosophical assumption of an ontologically 
distinct self, one which is separate from society. And the previously 
referenced “inevitable antagonism between individual and society” 
is reflected in Hayek’s definition of liberty as freedom from 
“coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others” (p. 6). Further-
more, this way of conceiving of freedom inevitably leads to a 
conflict between societal, democratic public goods and individual 
freedom. As previously shown, establishing individual liberty as 
the prime value leads to the dismantling of the more robustly civic 
purposes of public education, namely democratic education.
Naturalizing Freedom: Cartesian  
Epistemology and the Laws of Liberty
“The average man on the street is a Cartesian” (Searle, 1998).
Searle’s (1998) quote refers to an epistemological assumption both 
within the modern Western identity and within Hayek’s (1960) 
philosophy of freedom. Because the self, as knower, is separate 
from that which is to be known, the epistemological goal is to 
“discover” what is “really” real (as opposed to apparent) about the 
external world’s properties and then to make true statements about 
those properties. This project of seeking truth about the world— 
that is, Cartesian epistemology or the correspondence theory of 
truth— has, like our shared ontological assumption of self, deep 
roots in our history. And it is the Cartesian notion of knowledge, as 
opposed to, say, feminist epistemologies or pragmatism, which is 
dominant in our culture today.
The correspondence theory of truth is evident in Hayek’s 
(1960) philosophy of freedom as well. He recognizes his goal as 
contributing to the “science of liberty” by “discovering” the natural 
“laws of liberty” (p. 148). In other words, Hayek’s onto- 
epistemological project is to express the truth about freedom. He 
locates freedom where he locates all social mores, as objectively 
existing in the natural order that, in principle, can be observed and 
discovered. Hayek echoes the views espoused by Adam Smith and 
the Humean tradition, which assumed that “psychological laws, 
based on human nature, are as truly natural as any laws based on 
land and physical nature” (Dewey, 1935, p. 21). Thus, he locates the 
laws or properties of “real” freedom in human psychology that, in 
turn, is rooted in fixed essences of human nature. He then seeks to 
discover these “natural” laws of freedom by retrospectively (a 
posteriori) observing human behavior. The properties of freedom 
are not socially constructed but, rather, are objectively in the world 
waiting to be discovered. When Hayek views freedom objectively 
in the world, he “naturalizes” it.
Hayek (1960) uses the following observation of nature to 
argue that social mores, including freedom, are not created but 
discovered by observing social action because social rules and 
mores exist without rational consciousness; they are unconscious 
habits that are merely grasped by intelligence and subsequently 
articulated.
A degree of order, preventing too frequent fights or interference with the 
search of food, etc., here arises often from the fact that the individual, as 
it strays farther from its lair, becomes less ready to fight. In consequence, 
when two individuals meet at some intermediate place, one of them will 
usually withdraw without an actual trial of strength. Thus a sphere 
belonging to each individual is determined, not by the demarcation of a 
concrete boundary, but by the observation of a rule— a rule, of course, 
that is not known as such by the individual but that is honored in action 
[emphasis added]. (pp. 148– 149)
For Hayek, this example of the abstract rule of territorial 
defense proves that social rules of behavior exist whether or not 
there is consciousness; that is, action conforms to social rules 
before the articulation. So, the rules and mores that guide society 
are not the product of rational design but, rather, have developed 
from a course of nature, like the evolution of a species. He writes:
From these conceptions gradually grew a body of social theory that 
showed how, in the relations among men, complex and orderly and, in 
a very definite sense, purposive institutions might grow up which 
owed little to design, which were not invented but arose from the 
separate actions of many men who did not know what they were doing 
[emphasis added]. (pp. 58– 59)
In sum, social rules are followed, even if they are not con-
sciously discovered and articulated. The source of social mores is in 
“Nature” (or part of the providential plan ordained by God),5 not 
5 Things that are positioned as objectively in the world most often 
take the form of being either part of nature or part of the providential 
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reason or social construction. The result is an inevitable dichotomy 
between Nature and reason. It is not reason’s place to “create” or 
“invent” mores, such as freedom, but rather to grasp the principles 
of freedom that reveal themselves in the interrelations (i.e., 
observable behavior) among people.
From this perspective, a distinction arises between inability 
and unfreedom. For instance, because we are not Naturally flying 
animals, it is not for a lack of freedom that I cannot jump out my 
bedroom window and fly down to the office. For Hayek (1960), 
when action is restrained by the Natural order, then that restraint is 
not an unfreedom but an inability. It is only when action is 
restrained or coerced by other humans that inability becomes 
unfreedom. Therefore, only human reason and will, as dichoto-
mous with Nature, are constraints and threats to freedom; Nature 
cannot be. As such, Hayek defines coercion, as stemming not from 
Nature but from the “arbitrary will of another or others” (p. 11). For 
Hayek, Nature only provides inability; reason is the lone cause of 
coercion.
This does not mean that Hayek advocates for no legislation. 
He states that meta- laws of Lex Rex, or the “true” principles for the 
rule of law are ones that support the Natural laws of freedom. For 
example, one law of liberty Hayek “discovers” is equality (p. 209). 
What Hayek means by this is that all must be treated equally under 
man- made law. Although this attribute of a law of freedom has 
necessary, albeit sometimes problematic, distinctions the meta- law 
of equal treatment is “aimed at equally improving the chances of 
unknown people” (p. 210).
The logical consequence of this law of freedom is that material 
equality and equality under the law are mutually exclusive notions.
Equality before the law and material equality are therefore not only 
different but are in conflict with each other; and we can achieve either 
the one or the other, but not both at the same time. The equality before 
the law which freedom requires leads to material inequality [emphasis 
added]. (p. 87)
Any law that redistributes wealth to aid in social welfare and 
equality is not treating people equally under the law. In this case, we 
would be taking from one class and giving to another, and this 
classification harms one class while benefiting another. It is not 
aimed at improving the chances of unknown people but, rather, at 
improving the chances of a particular class of people. Hence, Hayek 
declares, “If the state further takes on positive duties, such as 
providing welfare services and adopting redistributive policies, 
then it would transform from a friend to a foe of individual 
freedom” (as cited in Silier, 2005, p.15).
In addition to inculcating certain democratic dispositions as a 
form of social planning, democratic educational policies also 
require redistribution of resources to provide for equality of 
order. For the sake of brevity and to be consistent with my terminology 
of “naturalizing” freedom, from hereafter I use a capital N and forgo 
qualifying the term nature with God or God’s plan in parentheses, even 
though it may be construed as either. Hence, I use a capital N to reflect 
nature becoming equated with God’s design.
educational opportunity. Yet these policies, as Hayek states, are 
seen as contradictory to, and must be justified against, the value of 
liberty. Inequality in school resources is seen as an inevitable result 
of adhering to the Natural value of freedom. Naturalizing freedom 
has a certain appeal in that freedom becomes something to be 
observed and discovered with a kind of certainty that absolves us of 
responsibility. We may not like material inequality, but if we follow 
the Natural laws of liberty, that is just the way it is. Once again, 
within the neoliberal framework, the preeminence of the value of 
“freedom” trumps the competing value of democratic public goods, 
including democratic education. And all of this makes perfect 
sense within the dominant strand of the modern Western identity, 
hence its insidiousness.
Submitting to Freedom: The Source of Moral Authority
So far, I have shown how Hayek’s (1960) view of liberty coheres with 
two core philosophical assumptions shared with the dominant 
strand of the modern Western identity, the ontologically distinct 
individual self and a Cartesian epistemology. I have also used 
Hayek to represent how our cultural identity makes sense of 
freedom, and this happens in such a way as to be inimical to 
democratic education. Yet, once again, Taylor’s (1989) depiction of 
the modern Western identity as fractious but with certain domi-
nant trends means certain beliefs that have developed in main-
stream Western thought are embedded generally, not universally, 
in our identity. Furthermore, Hayek’s articulations do not necessar-
ily cause but, rather, reflect how that identity makes sense of 
freedom.
The astute reader may have realized Hayek’s (1960) Natural-
ized version of freedom has an ethical assumption that Nature is 
the source of moral authority which prescribes what humans ought 
to do. It should come as no surprise, then, that I will claim this 
assumption has a history rooted in the Western tradition as well, 
albeit less dominantly than the first two: namely, the source of 
moral authority is external to human reason. In other words, the 
location of moral authority is in God or Nature or God’s design that 
reveals itself through Nature but not humanity itself.
Taylor (1989) maps three dominant beliefs about the sources 
of moral authority within Western cultural and philosophical 
history: original theistic grounding, scientism (or the naturalized 
world), and creative imagination of Romantic expressivism. 
Original theistic grounding posits the source of moral authority out 
“there,” objective and external to humanity, whether stemming 
from Plato’s external source of the light of the “Good” or, theisti-
cally, “God.” With the Protestant Reformation came an affirmation 
of ordinary life in which nature (including human nature) was seen 
as reflecting the providential order of things. This was the begin-
ning of what Taylor calls scientism, or the belief that the source of 
morality is in the design of Nature. Dewey (1935) wrote about this 
dichotomy between man and Nature as well: “Natural law was still 
regarded as something more fundamental than man- made law, 
which by comparison is artificial” (p. 20). Under this view, human-
ity and reason’s sole role is to grasp morality, not to be the source of 
it. Only in the case of the creative imagination of Romantic 
expressivism is the source of morality in humanity itself. So, in the 
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Western tradition of thought, there are two strands of belief in the 
source of morals as external to human reason.
This ethical assumption of moral authority is also evident in 
Hayek’s (1960) notion of freedom. His purpose for discovering the 
“laws of liberty” is, ultimately, to obey those laws:
While this applies to all our values, it is most important in the case of 
moral rules and conduct. Next to language, they are perhaps the most 
important instance of an undesigned growth, a set of rules which 
govern our lives but of which we can say neither why they are what 
they are nor what they do to us: we do not know what the 
consequences of observing them are for us as individuals and as a 
group. And it is against the demand for submission to such rules that 
the rationalistic spirit is in constant revolt [emphasis added].  
(pp. 64– 65)
Hayek is saying we must have faith beyond our reason and 
follow the social mores that are embedded in Nature and have 
evolved, even if we are not privy to the reasons why. Because 
morality is found in Nature and is above human understanding,  
we must have faith and submit to the undesigned rules that evolve 
through the trial and error processes of Natural evolution. We 
must trust in the Natural order because we do not and cannot 
know it all. Morals are discovered, they are part of Natural pro-
cesses and order, and social planning is to participate in the 
arrogance that man knows best, not Nature. “We have thus no 
choice but to submit to rules whose rationale we often do not know, 
and to do so whether or not we can see anything important 
depends on their being observed in the particular instance” 
[emphasis added] (pp. 66– 67). Thus, another seeming paradox 
arises: resigning ourselves to the laws of liberty or submitting to 
freedom.
Once again, it seems obvious how this thinking leads to the 
negation of social planning and implementation for the enhance-
ment of democratic education. As Hayek reveals, within the 
neoliberal framework human reason and will are threats to the 
Natural laws of freedom. To plan society is to believe that the 
rational powers of humanity are superior to those of Nature. 
Because of the limited capacity of reason, social planning results in 
unintended consequences, and therefore, should be shelved. Even 
if for democratic aims, using reason to intelligently attempt to 
design society is misguided.
The current marginalization of citizenship, moral, and 
character education, and the displacement of talk about the civic 
purposes of our public schools, is consistent with the neoliberal 
philosophy of freedom that locates the source of moral authority 
outside of shared deliberation, since curricula that are intended to 
pursue these aims are interpreted as participating in social 
planning. There is distrust in humanity as a source of moral 
authority, and a civic education that seeks to foster some form of 
the associative good life is antithetical to the more treasured value 
of the neoliberal conception of freedom.
Summary and Conclusions
Using Schein’s (2010) model of culture and method of clinical 
cultural analysis, I have interpreted an artifact of our culture, 
namely, the erosion of democratic education, as reflecting a deeper 
competing commitment to the neoliberal conception of the value 
freedom. Furthermore, I have analyzed neoliberal freedom as 
reflecting three core philosophical assumptions shared with the 
modern Western identity: an ontologically distinct self, a Cartesian 
epistemology in which the onto- epistemological project seeks to 
discover facts that correspond to the objective world, and a belief 
in the source of morality as external to human reason.
As an interpretative analysis, my purpose is not so much to 
prove these connections as it is to start a conversation (Burbules, 
2006) about the possible cultural elements that inhibit progress 
toward more democratic forms of education. Yet, if agreed that, in 
fact, the value of neoliberal freedom and its associated basic 
assumptions is part of the story that is enacted resulting in the 
marginalization of democratic education, then it would behoove 
those of us interested in democratic education to be conscious of 
these; for “shared assumptions derive their power from the fact that 
they begin to operate outside of awareness” (Schein, 2010, p. 12).
Another reason to expose cultural values and assumptions 
related to our problem is for critique (Burbules, 2006)— to 
critically reflect and examine the extent of those assumptions’ truth 
or usefulness. Testing basic assumptions is one way of catalyzing 
cultural change (Kegan & Lahey, 2009). In other words, my 
analysis implies that technical changes alone, such as teaching 
teachers how to conduct democratic education, will not enhance 
democratic education, since our current challenge is an adaptive, 
not a technical, one (Heifetz, 1994). Adaptive change points to 
strategies of changing mind- sets, not skill sets. And one method to 
foster adaptive change is to expose competing commitments and 
assumptions in order to test them. For the advancement of 
democratic education, we would do well to find ways to challenge 
the deeper, collective competing commitment to the value of 
neoliberal freedom and its three associated philosophical 
assumptions.
For example, Kegan and Lahey (2009) explain why individu-
als and groups participate in behavior that is counterproductive to 
their stated goals. They have observed organizational cultures 
performing actions contrary to ostensible aims because of deeper, 
shared, hidden commitments and assumptions. Using the example 
of a medical school faculty that aspired to incorporate more active 
learning in their pedagogy, Kegan and Lahey found that even 
though the faculty had the technical knowledge of how to incorpo-
rate active learning, the collective faculty were continuing to “teach 
to the tests” and not providing opportunities for students to apply 
acquired concepts (p. 109). Through the unveiling process it was 
revealed that the faculty held a deeper commitment to maintaining 
the school’s reputation and accreditation status. Further, there was 
a more deeply held assumption that licensure exams stressed 
factual retention rather than concepts and that students’ acquisi-
tion of core facts would be compromised by new teaching meth-
ods. Not until this assumption was intentionally tested did the 
organizational culture start to change. Thus, Kegan and Lahey’s 
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method consists of exposing and then purposely testing the extent 
of truthfulness of shared assumptions as a way to alter and enhance 
both individual and organizational performance (i.e., observable 
behavior).
Similarly, even if there is a professed cultural commitment to 
more democratic educational policies and practices, the neoliberal 
notion of the value freedom plays a complicit role in preventing 
action toward these stated aims. Therefore, both the neoliberal 
conception of freedom and its three associated basic assumptions 
need to be challenged.
How can we deliberately challenge the story of the ontologi-
cally distinct individual self? What can we do to foster a more social 
conception of self? Palmer (2011) echoes this sentiment by lauding 
the tension between communalism and individualism with the 
advice of “allowing each to check the other’s darker potential” (p. 
43). Yet the American emphasis on individualism has skewed the 
equilibrium. We must launch a concerted effort in testing the belief 
of the ontologically distinct individual that is so entrenched in our 
cultural identity if we are to strike the balance Palmer is looking for.
How can we purposefully interrupt Cartesian epistemology 
and foster beliefs in other ways of knowing? How can curriculum 
become more, or at least equal to, knowing for rather than knowing 
about? The dominant epistemological belief of the quest for 
certainty and discovering knowledge about the world used by 
Hayek (1960) in his philosophy of freedom is only one theory of 
knowledge; we forget there are other ways of knowing, for example 
knowing for (i.e., wisdom). Palmer (2011) also argues against the 
over- reliance on Cartesian epistemology. I cannot phrase it better 
than he:
But many educated Americans who rise to positions of responsibility 
believe they must operate almost exclusively on the basis on what can 
be observed and measured because they are educated in a system that 
mistakenly defines reality that way. And yet, everything human is 
driven by the invisible powers of the heart. From falling in love with a 
person who changes the course of your life to distrusting people of a 
different race, from acts of astonishing courage to the most barbaric of 
cruelties, from the curiosity that animates science to the fears that 
paralyze the mind, the human heart is the backstage directing the 
action. Ignore that simple truth, and we put ourselves and our world at 
risk by missing critical clues about real life.
Once again, I am using the word heart to refer to an integral way of 
knowing . . . 
When we learn to think with the “mind descended into the 
heart”— integrating cognition and emotion with other faculties like 
sensation, intuition, and bodily knowledge— the result can be insight, 
wisdom, and the courage to act on what we know. (pp. 54– 55)
Thus, in addition to challenging an individualized conception 
of self, we must also disrupt the assumed correspondence theory of 
truth and foster the acceptance of other ways of knowing.
For those interested in fostering democratic education, it 
seems appropriate to incorporate an additional strategy of chal-
lenging the third central philosophical assumption shared by the 
neoliberal framework and the modern Western identity. How can 
we intentionally foster faith in humanity’s reasonableness as the 
source of moral authority for collective action (see Pritchard, 1996, 
for a distinction between rationality and reasonableness)? How can 
we facilitate discussions about moral matters and encourage a trust 
in our collective reasoning as a way to inquire and act for self- 
governance? We must develop ways to intentionally question the 
source of moral authority as outside humanity and to foster a 
confidence in human reasonability as a source of moral authority.
Neoliberalism’s success in infiltrating the national discourse 
shuts out alternative discourses and appears to render them 
irrelevant in everyday American culture (R. Quantz, personal 
communication, Summer 2006). If we care about the prospects of 
democratic education, we must take neoliberalism’s success 
seriously, for it is a philosophical framework in which freedom and 
democratic education are mutually exclusive. Dewey (1993), in all 
his wisdom, warned:
And let those who are struggling to replace the present economic 
system by a cooperative one also remember that in struggling for a new 
system of social restraints and controls they are also struggling for a 
more equal and equitable balance of powers that will enhance and 
multiply the effective liberties of the mass of individuals. Let them not 
be jockeyed into the position of supporting social control at the expense 
of liberty [emphasis added]. (p. 160)
Yet, that is exactly the situation in which we find ourselves 
today. Democratic education is viewed as a social control policy,  
as an infringement on the supremacy of the value freedom. We 
witness a lack of democratic citizenship, moral, and character 
education in our schools. We see a lack of redistributing resources 
for equality of educational opportunity. We observe a lack of talk 
about education’s civic mission, roles, and goals. Democratic 
education is viewed as tangential, secondary, and mutually 
exclusive from the prioritized value of “liberty.” How can we foster 
alternative notions of freedom, such as Lincoln’s republican sense 
of liberty as collectively inquiring and deciding how we rule 
ourselves? We must intentionally challenge the neoliberal notion of 
the value freedom and the usefulness of its associated philosophical 
assumptions.
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